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BURSTING THE BUBBLE: MOVING TOWARD
“THE COMMON SENSE PRINCIPLE” WHEN
CONSIDERING AIR AGGREGATION OF
OIL AND GAS FACILITIES
MICHAEL K. REER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic increase in natural gas production in the United
States has created new challenges for administrative agencies tasked
with protecting the nation’s environment.  One such challenge con-
cerns the application of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to an industry
with a myriad of interconnected pipelines, production wells, and
treatment plants.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has a policy that favors the aggregation, or grouping to-
gether, of upstream and midstream natural gas facilities connected
by pipelines.  Aggregation often has the effect of combining several
otherwise minor sources of emissions into one major source.  Justifi-
cation for a policy of widespread aggregation stems from the EPA’s
broad interpretation of “adjacent”—one of the regulatory bounda-
ries of the agency’s ability to aggregate—which the agency defines
through the functional interrelatedness test.  The functional inter-
relatedness test analyzes the utilitarian relationship between multi-
ple emissions points, inquiring whether each individual point could
be economically productive without the existence of the others.
The functional interrelatedness test has recently faced chal-
lenges to its validity before both state environmental review boards
and federal courts.  A growing number of oil and natural gas pro-
ducing states, including Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas, are clamoring for agencies to replace the functional interre-
latedness interpretation of “adjacent” with one that focuses on the
common sense notion of proximity.  Some oil and natural gas pro-
ducing states recently developed an informal policy of automati-
cally aggregating emissions points within a quarter mile of each
other.  These states then deploy the functional interrelatedness test
beyond the quarter mile limit.  At least one state, Texas, has bucked
this trend by enacting legislation banning the aggregation of emis-
* Babst Calland Clements & Zomnir, P.C.; BA. 2010, Boston College; J.D.,
2013, Boston College Law School; LL.M., 2014 University of Houston.  Unless oth-
erwise noted, this article was current as of May 30, 2014.
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sion points separated by distances greater than a quarter mile.  A
strict outer limit, found in the Texas model, comports with the
common sense notion of “adjacent” and fulfills the duty to promul-
gate regulations which are both consistent and easy to predict.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part surveys the background issues necessary to under-
stand the functional interrelatedness test, the common sense prin-
ciple, and the stakes involved in the administrative choice between
the two.  Part II.A examines the CAA’s statutory and regulatory
scheme for regulating air pollutants and explains the difference be-
tween major and minor sources.  Part II.B describes how the statu-
tory scheme applies to the oil and natural gas industry and analyzes
the stakes involved with respect to source classification.  Finally,
Part II.C explains the development of the bubble concept by which
several minor sources of emissions are grouped together to form
one major source.
A. The Clean Air Act’s Statutory Scheme
The CAA, passed in 1970, is designed “to protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare. . . .”1  In 1990, Congress amended the CAA to
institute a national air quality permitting system referred to as Title
V.2  Title V works to augment the CAA’s preexisting framework by
requiring regulated sources of air pollution to “obtain operating
permits that include emission limitations, standards, monitoring re-
quirements, compliance schedules, and other conditions necessary
to assure compliance with the CAA.”3  This scheme primarily regu-
lates two types of pollutants: pollutants reasonably anticipated to
endanger the public health, called criteria pollutants, and those
pollutants which are known to cause either an increase in fatalities
or serious, irreversible illnesses, called hazardous air pollutants
(HAPs).4
The CAA regulates six criteria pollutants reasonably antici-
pated to endanger the public health: ozone, particulate matter, car-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1990).
2. Air Pollution Operating Permit Program Update: Key Features and Benefits, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oaqps001/permits/permitupdate/brochure
.html (last updated July 26, 2011) (outlining air permit program and policy
concerns).
3. Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2012) (outlin-
ing compliance requirements of CAA).
4. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 61, 63 (defining pollutant criteria).
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bon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxides, and lead.5  Of
these six, ozone, particulate matter, and nitrous oxides represent
the most common emissions resulting from natural gas produc-
tion.6  On a national level, regulation of criteria pollutants takes
place through the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS).7  A much more stringent regulatory scheme applies to
HAPs, which pose acute hazards to human and ecological health.8
Upstream and midstream oil and natural gas operations may re-
lease a variety of HAPs, including n-hexane, formaldehyde, ben-
zene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene, and hydrogen sulfide.9
The CAA, which allows state implementation of NAAQS pro-
grams, depends on a system of cooperative federalism for the im-
plementation of its provisions.10  States that wish to operate their
own permitting processes must submit State Implementation Plans
(SIPs) to the EPA.11  These implementation plans, at a minimum,
must meet the floor regulatory requirements set forth by the EPA.12
If a state does not meet the floor requirements, the EPA may im-
5. What are the Six Common Air Pollutants?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www
.epa.gov/air/urbanair/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (outlining common air
pollutants).
6. Colin G. Harris & Ivan L. London, There’s Something in the Air: New and
Evolving Air Quality Regulations Impacting Oil and Gas Development, 58 RMMLF-INST
6-1, 6-7 (2012) (discussing changing regulations in light of oil and gas develop-
ment).  Carbon dioxide is a major emission source from electric plants, which use
natural gas as a fuel. See also Clean Energy, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2014).
7. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last updated Dec. 14) (outlining air quality
standard).
8. See Pollutants and Sources, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
ttnatw01/pollsour.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) (discussing HAP regulatory
scheme).
9. Harris & London, supra note 6 (discussing impact of new oil and gas pro-
duction on regulation); see also The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 List of Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/orig189
.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (enumerating CAA list of hazardous air
pollutants).
10. William Session, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act Encounter Turbu-
lence, AM. COLL. OF ENVTL. LAW., available at http://www.acoel.org/post/2012/12/
14/COOPERATIVE-FEDERALISM-AND-THE-CLEAN-AIR-ACT-ENCOUNTER-
TURBULENCE.aspx (last updated Nov. 7, 2014) (discussing federal and state re-
sponsibilities in CCA).
11. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410 (1990) (outlining state responsibilities under CAA).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(d)(3), (i)(3) (1990) (outlining baseline state responsi-
bilities under CAA).
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pose a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).13  States try to avoid
FIPs because the EPA’s federal regulations and accompanying sanc-
tions tend to be more stringent and less flexible than delegated
state programs.14
Under the CAA, new major sources must receive both a pre-
construction permit, through New Source Review (NSR), and a
post-construction operating permit through Title V.
With respect to a pre-construction permit, if a facility qualifies
as a major source in an attainment area, the requirements of the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program (PSD) govern the
permitting process.15  The PSD permit process requires the appli-
cant to show that the new source of emissions will not have an unac-
ceptable impact on air quality and that it will control emissions
using the best available control technology (BACT).16  EPA regula-
tions define BACT as the maximum reduction of emissions possi-
ble, taking into account a variety of industry factors such as
economic feasibility and other available methods and techniques.17
In a nonattainment area, the permit applicant must obtain a
nonattainment NSR permit prior to the commencement of con-
struction.18  It must show that it satisfies the lowest achievable emis-
sions rate (LAER), which the regulations define as the more
stringent of: (1) the most stringent emissions limitation found in
any SIP for the relevant class of industrial emissions or (2) “the
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990) (outlining state plan requirements of NASQs).
Federal Operating Permit Programs, 40 C.F.R. Pt. 71 sets forth a comprehensive
federal permit program consistent with the requirements of Title V, and defines
the procedures pursuant to which EPA will issue Title V permits in the absence of
an approved state or tribal program.  40 C.F.R. Pt. 71.
14. See generally EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (U.S. 2013); Virginia v. U.S., 74
F.3d 517, 520 (4th Cir. 1996); Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(noting that state’s failure to submit qualified implementation plan could result in
the loss of federal highway funds).
15. Harris & London, supra note 6, at 6-8, 6-9 (discussing new regulatory re-
quirements for oil and gas production).
16. Id. at 6-11; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479 (1990) (discussing control technology
requirements).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1990) (outlining statutory control requirements).
The term “best available control technology” means an emission limitation based
on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation
under this chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility,
which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable
for such facility through application of production processes and available meth-
ods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or
innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant.
18. See  Permit Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(a)(1)(xiii)(2011) (outlining
requirements of production in nonattainment area).
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol26/iss1/2
2015] BURSTING THE BUBBLE 65
most stringent emissions limitation achieved in practice by a class
or category of stationary sources.”19
Under Title V, every new major source must obtain an operat-
ing permit.20  Several factors determine whether a facility consti-
tutes a major source, but in general, a source of emissions triggers
major source classification if it emits more than 100 tons per year
(tpy) of any criteria pollutant.21  Major stationary sources face expo-
sure to extremely detailed, and sometimes cumbersome, federal
regulations under NSR and Title V while minor sources must com-
ply with only “the barest of requirements”.22
Because the pre- and post-construction requirements for major
sources of air pollution are considered difficult to meet, industrial
emissions sources have significant incentives to be classified as mi-
nor, rather than major, sources.23
19. See id.; see also Guidance for Performing Single Stationary Source Determinations
for Oil and Gas Industries, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT. (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.e
library.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-90745/Final%20Guidance%20for%
20Performing%20Single%20Stationary%20Source%20Determinations%20for%20
OG%20Industries_Technical%20Guidance10-6-12.pdf.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (1990) (outlining new source responsibilities).
21. Air Permits, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/per-
mit/defn.html#majorsource (last visited Nov. 7, 2014); 40 C.F.R. § 71.2; see also
Harris & London, supra note 6 (discussing standard of categorizing whether source
qualifies as major).
To determine if a facility has a [potential to emit (PTE)] above a permit-
ting threshold, the operator generally must assume worst-case operating
conditions.  In other words, PTE is the maximum amount of emissions
that a facility could emit if it operated at 100% design capacity, 24 hours
per day, 365 days per year.
Id. at 6-9.
22. See Luminant Generation Co., L.L.C. v. EPA, 675 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir.
2012) (finding that major and minor sources have vastly different regulatory
requirements).
For “major” NSR, which applies to the construction or modification of
stationary sources that meet certain threshold emissions levels, the CAA
sets forth the parameters for the permit programs in considerable detail.
The implementing regulations for major NSR are similarly extensive and
complex, spanning 88 pages in the Code of Federal Regulations.  In stark
contrast, the CAA prescribes only the barest of requirements for “minor”
NSR, which governs the construction or modification of stationary
sources that do not meet the emissions thresholds for major NSR.  For
minor NSR, the Act requires simply that each SIP include . . . regulation
of the modification and construction of any stationary source within the
areas covered by the plan as necessary to assure that [NAAQS] are
achieved.  The implementing regulations for minor NSR are likewise
sparse, spanning less than two pages in the Code of Federal Regulations
Id. at 922 (internal citations omitted).
23. See generally Gary McCutchen, July 28, 1987 Letter Concerning Best Availa-
ble Control Technology (BACT) Determinations, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, (July 28,
1987), http://www.epa.gov/NSR/ttnnsr01/psd1/p8_20.html; see also Air Permits,
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In addition, state agencies often allow minor sources to use
general permits and permits by rule, a practice that allows appli-
cants to streamline the permit approval process.24  Applicants may
use general permits when they have many similar minor facilities
within a jurisdiction.25  Once the state regulatory agency issues one
permit, the applicant may simply duplicate the permit’s terms for
each additional facility.26  Similarly, state agencies can design per-
mits by rule for minor facilities that are relatively common in the
state.27  For example, in states that traditionally produce oil and
natural gas, environmental agencies may choose to automatically
grant a permit on pre-determined terms for certain types of minor
sources such as compressor stations.28  Finally, while the applicant
must provide copies of major source permits to the EPA, which in
turn presents them for public notice and comment, applicants face
no such requirement during review of new minor sources.29
The EPA has implemented a regulatory scheme for HAPs simi-
lar to the one for criteria pollutants.30  The HAP regulatory scheme
allows for less significant differences between major and minor
sources of emissions because science has shown that even limited
exposure to extremely hazardous materials damages public
supra note 21 (mentioning that new source review under Title V can take up to
three years).
24. Review of New Sources and Modifications in Indian Country; Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. 38,748, (July 1, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 49 and 51); see
e.g., General Operating Permits, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www
.tceq.texas.gov/permitting/air/nav/air_genoppermits.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2014); Indexes to Air Permits by Rule, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www
.tceq.texas.gov/permitting/air/permitbyrule/air_pbr_index.html (last visited Nov.
7, 2014) (discussing exceptions allowed for minor sources).
25. Permits: Permit Classifications, AZ. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www
.azdeq.gov/environ/air/permits/class.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (discussing
general permits).
A general permit is a pre-approved permit and certificate that covers a
specific class of sources.  A general permit differs from an individual per-
mit in that it can be applied to more than one source, is usually more
restrictive, less expensive, and requires a shorter period of time for the
processing and issuance of an Authorization to Operate (ATO).
Id.
26. Id. (discussing permits).
27. See Permit-by-Rule Application; GA. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., ENVT’L PROT.
DIV., AIR PROT. BRANCH, http://www.georgiaair.org/airpermit/html/sspp/pbrap-
plic.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2014); Air Permits by Rule, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL.
QUALITY, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/permitting/air/nav/air_pbr.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2014) (discussing permit by rule exception for minor sources).
28. See e.g., Indexes to Air Permits by Rule, supra note 24 (discussing permit ad-
vantages of minor sources).
29. 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(h) (showing no public comment requirement for minor
source).
30. Id. (outlining HAP scheme).
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health.31  Instead of employing the major/minor distinction
adopted by the criteria pollutants control scheme, environmental
agencies use HAPs to differentiate between major sources and area
sources.32  Major sources have the potential to emit either 10 tpy of
any one HAP or 25 tpy of a mixture of HAPs, whereas agencies
consider area sources as those which simply emit less than the ma-
jor source thresholds.33  The EPA mandates that major HAP
sources use maximum achievable control technology (MACT), de-
fined as “the emission limitation achieved in practice by the best
controlled similar source.”34  For area sources, the EPA has some
discretion to modify technology standards on a pollutant-by-pollu-
tant basis.35  Currently, the regulations require area sources to com-
ply with MACT standards, but the EPA may downgrade less serious
HAPs to generally available control technology on a pollutant-by-
pollutant basis.36  Unlike major sources, the regulations generally
do not subject area sources to Title V permitting requirements and
therefore area sources face less administrative restrictions during
modification.37
B. Applying the Statutory Scheme to the Natural Gas Industry
Natural gas development can subject upstream producers to
the air permitting process at several stages of production.38  Gener-
31. Taking Toxics Out of the Air Pt. 1, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/airquality/takingtoxics/p1.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (outlining public
health effects of air pollutants).  “A key component of the Clean Air Act is a re-
quirement that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) significantly re-
duce daily, so-called routine emissions of the most potent air pollutants: those that
are known or suspected to cause serious health problems such as cancer or birth
defects.” (internal quotations omitted). Id.
32. Pollutants and Sources, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
ttnatw01/pollsour.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (defining between major sources
and area sources of pollution).
33. Id. (defining between major sources and area sources of pollution). Id.
34. 40 C.F.R. § 63.41 (defining regulatory terms and outlining control tech-
nology requirements); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1990) (defining hazardous air
pollutants).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1)-(2) (1990) (outlining emission standards); see
Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. EPA., 59 F.3d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (interpreting EPA
regulations for major and area source standards).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(5) (1990) (discussing alternative standards for area
sources); see Nat’l Min. Ass’n, 59 F.3d at 1353 (holding area source standards less
stringent than major sources.
37. Nat’l Min. Ass’n, 59 F.3d at 1353 (denying petition for review on regulatory
except question why EPA criteria for federal approval and consequences are re-
lated to ensuring practical effectiveness of state goals under § 112).
38. See generally Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014)
(outlining EPA regulatory scheme and policy goals).
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ally speaking, air regulations touch on four stages of the natural gas
production process: the well pad itself, the gathering facility, the
compressor station, and the processing facility, also known as a
treatment plant.39  First, the collection well pad itself may trigger
permitting requirements.40  In enhanced production wells, such as
in the instance of hydraulic fracturing, portions of the fracturing
fluid might evaporate during flow-back and emit volatile organic
compounds into the atmosphere.41  Engineers usually design the
well to trap as much of the gaseous material coming out of the
ground as possible upon its completion, and therefore the capped
well typically produces only a negligible amount of emissions after
the operator removes the flow-back water.42  However, under cer-
tain circumstances operators may choose to flare natural gas either
in preparation for collection or to alleviate pressure on the gas col-
lection equipment.43
Small gathering pipelines, which combine the output of several
wells as the pipeline network advances to its destination, transport
39. See Air Permitting Requirements Changed in Pa. and Oh. GROUNDWATER AND
ENVT’L SERV., INC. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.gesonline.com/node/224 (listing
production steps at which natural gas operators might be exposed to air permit
regulation).
40. Id. (discussing production steps wherein natural gas operators may face
air permit regulation).
41. Harris & London, supra note 6, at 6-17 (discussing changing regulations
of oil and gas production).
42. David G. Mandelbaum, One Air Emission Source or Many?, LEGAL INT. (June
28, 2011), http://www.environmentalandenergylawblog.com/uploads/file/6_28_
11_One_Air_Emission_Source_or_Many.pdf (discussing 2011 appeals to Penn-
sylvania Environmental Hearing Board).
In some places, the gas that comes out of the well is ‘wet,’ meaning that
when it cools and becomes less pressured at the surface, some of the
larger molecules other than methane will condense into liquids.  The well
may require a condensate tank to collect these liquids, and some of those
liquids will evaporate if left uncontrolled.  Nevertheless, natural gas wells
themselves are highly unlikely to be major sources of air emissions.
Id.
43. Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2012); see also
Space View of Natural Gas Flaring Darkened by Budget Woes, NAT’L GEO., (last visited
Nov. 7, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/10/
131009-budget-woes-darken-space-view-of-gas-flaring/ (noting problem of flaring is
particularly concerning in some areas of shale boom, such as North Dakota); but
see Jim Wedeking, Up in the Air: The Future of Environmental Management for Hydraulic
Fracturing will Be About Air, Not Water, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 437 (discussing state’s re-
sponse to increase in natural gas production).  “Despite these standard industry
practices, many seem to believe that flaring is a rarity and that well service compa-
nies and their clients prefer to vent methane directly to the atmosphere. . . [T]his
causes considerable controversy in estimating greenhouse gas emissions from hy-
draulically fractured wells.” Id. at 463.
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the natural gas from the well pad to a gathering facility.44  The gath-
ering facility creates the pressure necessary to move the gas through
the main pipeline running from the gathering facility to the
processing facility.45  The gas compressors used to create this artifi-
cial pressure typically run on processed natural gas and therefore
release emissions.46  Once at the processing facility, the natural gas
undergoes treatment to purify the gas by removing unwanted com-
ponents such as water, helium, and carbon dioxide.47  Because of
the enormous amount of natural gas that treatment plants must
process to become profitable, processing facilities are often either
major sources of emissions in their own right or extremely close to
being classified as such.48
Treatment plants aside, oil and natural gas operators do not
usually create enough emissions to qualify as major sources because
the industry has found it far more efficient to use many small, local
facilities instead of larger, more regional installations.49  The indus-
try’s preference for smaller facilities arises from the decreased cost
and increased efficiency local facilities can provide.50  Natural gas
producers have such a strong preference for the flexibility and cost
efficiency that local facilities can provide that they seem unlikely to
make a strategic shift toward larger, more regional facilities even if
agencies promulgate more stringent air quality standards through
aggregation.51
44. How Does the Natural Gas Delivery System Work?, AM. AMERICAN GAS ASS’N,
http://www.aga.org/Kc/aboutnaturalgas/consumerinfo/Pages/NGDeliverySys
tem.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (outlining pipeline transportation process of
natural gas delivery system).
45. Id. (detailing purpose of gathering facility).
46. Id. (describing inner workings of gas compressors).
47. Processing Natural Gas, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://naturalgas.org/natural-
gas/processing-ng/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (explaining natural gas purification
process).
48. See Mandelbaum, supra note 44, at 2 (noting processing facilities’ negative
consequences).
49. See Harris & London, supra note 6, at 6-12 (describing industry standard of
using multiple small facilities).
50. See Response of CDPHE, Air Pollution Control Div., to Order Granting
Petition for Objection to Permit at 8-23, 34-42 (July 14, 2010), In re Kerr-McGee/
Anadarko Petroleum Corp., Frederick Compressor Station, EPA Pet. No. VIII-
2008-02 (EPA Adm’r Oct. 8, 2009) (Responding to petition).
51. See John R. Jacus, Developments and Trends in Clean Air Act Source “Aggrega-
tion”, Presentation to Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, Special Institute:
Air Quality Issues Affecting Oil, Gas, and Mining Development in the West (Feb.
28, 2011), http://www.dgslaw.com/images/materials/Jacus-RMMLF-010313.pdf.
In considering the proximity of various oil and gas facilities, one must also be
mindful that oil and gas conservation concepts and rules, as well as the economics
of drilling, completing and operating producing oil and gas wells, largely dictate
how far apart producing oil and gas wells are located, as noted above.  Oil and gas
9
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Beyond avoiding more stringent emissions standards, the natu-
ral gas industry seems particularly incentivized to avoid major
source classification for two reasons.52  First, once an implementing
agency classifies a series of facilities as a major source, any modifica-
tion of the point sources becomes significantly more difficult.53
The natural gas industry places a premium on infrastructure flexi-
bility, in part because well pad, compressor station, and pipeline
needs may change as a field matures and becomes more geologi-
cally certain.54  Second, major sources subject to the Title V pro-
gram must file, under penalty of perjury, annual compliance
certifications and deviation reports, which list the failures of the
emissions points to comply with the issued permitting standards.55
Oil and gas producers subject to the Title V program expend signif-
icant legal fees preparing and filing what amounts to a type of pub-
lic confession.56  Deviation reports can leave the oil and gas
conservation laws and regulations were largely developed after experiencing the
waste that can result from adherence to a pure “capture rule,” as was the case in
the early days of the oil and gas industry.  So the proximity of wells to one another
is not necessarily a function of their interrelationship, but more a function of how
far apart or close together wells should be in order to efficiently extract the re-
source and promote its development, while preventing waste.  Indeed, spacing or-
ders and rules are intended to prevent wells from being too “near or close” to one
another. See Response of CDPHE, supra note 50; In re Kerr-McGee/Anadarko Pe-
troleum Corp., supra note 52 (arguing benefits of local facilities).
52. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.2957 (establishing requirements for deviation report);
Air Permits, supra note 21 (giving overview of classification).
53. See Air Permits, supra note 21 (reporting that modifications of major
sources which result in further emissions might require installation of Best Availa-
ble Control Technology, air quality analysis, additional impacts analysis; and public
participation).
54. See Multi-Well Pad Drilling: Octopus, SHALE STUFF (July 28, 2013), http://
shalestuff.com/controversy-2/multi-well-pad-drilling-octpus/article08580 (describ-
ing multiple well pad drilling developments); Luke Geiver, Flexible Pipeline Provider
Expands Into ND, THE BAKKEN MAGAZINE (Aug. 28, 2013), http://thebakken.com/
articles/302/flexible-pipeline-provider-expands-into-nd (providing specific exam-
ple of new pipeline facility).
55. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.2957 (imposing NSPS deviation requirements); 40
C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(3)(iii) (imposing Title V deviation requirements); 40 C.F.R.
§ 70.6(c)(5).
56. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.2958 (stating requirements of deviation reports).  The
requirements of the deviation reports include:
(a) the calendar dates and times unit deviated from emission limitations
or operating limit requirements, (b) averaged and recorded data for
those dates, (c) durations and causes of each deviation from emission
limitations or operating limits and corrective actions, (d) a copy of the
operating limit monitoring data during each deviation and any test re-
port that documents the emission levels, (e) dates, times, number, dura-
tion, and causes for monitor downtime incidents, (f) Whether each
deviation occurred during a period of startup, shutdown, or malfunction,
or during another period. (g) The dates, times, and durations of any by-
pass of the control device.
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operator exposed to citizen suits that request civil penalties for the
mandatory, self-reported deviations.57
The importance of achieving operational flexibility and avoid-
ing citizen suits can sometimes overshadow industry concerns over
the different regulatory treatment standards applied to major and
minor sources.58  The overshadowing occurs in part because the
regulatory standards applied to major and minor sources of oil and
natural gas related emissions are more similar than the categoriza-
tions might imply at first glance.59  The New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS) program, which mandates emissions standards
for particular industries, applies to oil and natural gas production
and development, largely diminishing the regulatory difference be-
tween major and minor sources in the natural gas industry.60  The
NSPS standards for oil and gas facilities, while below the BACT ma-
jor source standard, remain nonetheless fairly rigorous and a clear
step up from what other minor sources would face.61  For example,
NSPS regulations require production wells to perform “green com-
pletion” on minor source well pads.62  Green completions use cap-
ture technology designed to remove 95% of the volatile organic
compounds (VOCs), such as oil and natural gas particles, that oth-
Id.
57. See e.g., Hughes v. Benedict, Appeal No. lO-03-AQB, West Virginia Air
Quality Board, Charleston, WV, http://www.wvaqb.org/finalorders/10-03-aqb%20-
%20final%20order.pdf (last accessed Nov. 9, 2013) (dismissing citizen suit bring-
ing challenge to major source permit granted to oil and gas development
company).
58. See generally Standards for Oil and Natural Gas Production, Transmission
and Storage, 77 Fed. Reg. 49490 (2012)(to be codified  at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (stating
EPA oil and natural gas emissions standards); BRACEWELL & GIULIANI; West Virginia
Dismisses Challenge to Marcellus Oil and Gas Development Clean Air Act Permits, (May 26,
2011), http://www.bracewellgiuliani.com/news-publications/updates/west-vir-
ginia-dismisses-challenge-marcellus-oil-and-gas-development-clean-.  As an example
of how EPA has stretched these terms, EPA has found sources more than 20 miles
apart to be contiguous and adjacent, defying the Webster’s dictionary definition of
“contiguous” and “adjacent.”  Such EPA actions have allowed various interest
groups to use the Clean Air Act appeals and permitting process to try to halt oil
and gas development in the United States. Id.
59. Overview of Final Amendments to Air Regulations for the Oil and Gas Industry,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417fs
.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (anticipating amended air regulation industry
impact).
60. Id. (generalizing industrial emissions standards).
61. New Source Performance Standards and State Implementation Plans, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/monitoring/programs/caa/new
source.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (describing NSPS standards for
compliance).
62. See 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490, 49,490-1 (highlighting one example of new NSPS
regulations).
11
Reer: Bursting the Bubble: Moving Toward "The Common Sense Principle" W
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
72 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI: p. 61
erwise might escape into the air from flow-back water.63  Further-
more, while many industries define an actionable NEHAP leak at
1,000 ppm, the NSPS program mandates that the natural gas indus-
try use a 500 ppm definition.64  Avoiding major source classification
can affect the permitting of well pads, gathering facilities, compres-
sor stations, and treatment plants while helping to avoid mandatory
deviation reports and associated penalties.65
C. Development of the Bubble Concept
Although the law seems clear on what applicants must demon-
strate to achieve PSD and Title V compliance, regulators and en-
ergy producers have wrangled over the administrative practice of
combining several points of energy production-related emissions to-
gether through a holistic concept of “source.”66  The practice of
combining several otherwise minor sources of emissions into one
major source is often referred to as air aggregation.67
The CAA does not extrapolate on “stationary source,” but the
EPA has defined a “stationary source” as “any building, structure,
facility, or installation which emits or may emit a regulated air pol-
lutant.”68  This list, though vague, is exclusive, and therefore several
emissions activities must be of the same building, structure, facility,
or installation or they may not be aggregated together.69  The
vagueness of the air aggregation regulations was tested in Alabama
Power, in which the D.C. Circuit Court ordered the EPA to develop
further regulations to give more definition and predictability to the
exclusive list of emissions points which it could aggregate to-
gether.70  In response, the EPA developed a three-pronged test to
determine whether agencies could aggregate otherwise minor
63. Id. (explaining green completions).
64. Leak Detection and Repair: A Best Practices Guide, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/assistance/ldarguide
.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (providing leak regulation breakdown).
65. See generally Randy E. Brogdon & Mark McGuffy, Recent Trends in CAA Citi-
zen Suits: Managing Risk in the Serengeti, http://www.troutmansanders.com/files/
upload/BrogdonCAAarticle.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (describing necessity
for scrupulous reporting due to increased citizen involvement).
66. See e.g., Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2012)
(debating the correct application of “source”).
67. Laurens H. Rhinelander, The Proper Place for the Bubble Concept Under the
Clean Air Act, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10406, (1983) (defining air aggregation).
68. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(5) (defining stationary source).
69. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (limiting
definition of source under NSPS provisions).
70. Id. (allowing aggregation of individual units into a single source).
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sources.71  Agencies may consider multiple emissions points part of
the same building, structure, facility, or installation if the emissions
points are; (1) under common control, (2) “located on one or
more contiguous or adjacent properties,” and (3) belong to the
same industrial group.72  If the emission points fail to satisfy all
three prongs, agencies may not aggregate them for the purposes of
NSR permitting.73
The first and third prongs of the test for the most part have
been less controversial.  40 C.F.R. § 71.2 employs a relatively
straightforward analysis to determine whether common ownership
or control of emissions points exists.74  The regulations consider
emissions activities under the same ownership or control when one
company either (1) owns all of the emissions points or (2) has at
least a 50% interest in all entities that have ownership of emissions
points throughout the area under determination.75  Recently, there
has been some controversy caused by implementing agencies sug-
gesting that a contract, such as a gas gathering agreement, can cre-
ate common control.76
Similarly, the third prong of the test, that the sources belong to
the same industrial grouping, applies in a less subjective manner
than it might appear at first blush.77  The 1980 PSD regulations es-
tablished the use of two-digit major Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (SIC) codes to select which industry group applies to a given
activity.78  To determine if the sources of emissions fall under the
same industrial grouping, the regulatory agency simply compares
the SIC code numbers for each activity.79  If all the SIC codes
71. See 40 C.F.R. § 71.2 (defining relevant emissions factors under Clean Air
Act).
72. Id. (providing elements of “major source”).
73. Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2012) (dem-
onstrating Summit Petroleum’s failure to aggregate).
74. See generally 45 C.F.R. 59, 878 (Sept. 11, 1980) (defining control).
75. Id. (expanding definition of control).
76. See e.g., Application for Authorization to Use General Plan Approval and/
or General Operating Permit General Permit or BAQ-GPA/GP-5 Natural Gas Com-
pression and/or Processing Facilities, PADEP Doc No: 2700-PM-BAQ0205, http://
www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-106065/2700-PM-BAQ0205%
20GP-5%20Application%20Form.pdf (requesting contracts for service agreements
between nearby wells, compressor stations, and processing facilities to receive gen-
eral permit).
77. Richard Alonso & Sandra Snyder, The Functional Interrelatedness Test: Is the
End in Sight? 14 No. 1 ABA ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMM. NEWSL., 5 (Sept.
30, 2013) (discussing merits of interrelatedness test).
78. Id. (commenting on ease of adjacent determination upon introduction of
SIC codes).
79. Id. (reiterating ease with use of SIC codes).
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match, as one would expect for various oil and natural gas produc-
tion activities, §71.2 considers the emissions points part of the same
industrial grouping.80
Generally speaking, air aggregation determinations remain
most controversial with respect to the second prong of the analy-
sis.81  While the meaning of “contiguous” seems relatively straight-
forward, for a majority of the past 30 years the EPA has defined
adjacent through the functional interrelatedness test.82  The func-
tional interrelatedness test determines the degree to which multi-
ple emissions points relate to one another in their utility to
industry.83  When using the functional interrelatedness test to de-
termine if multiple emissions points are related and therefore adja-
cent, the EPA has informally sought to determine whether; (1) “the
locations of two facilities were selected to enable integration;” (2)
“any physical link or transportation of materials between the two
emission sources” exists; (3) “workers travel between the two emis-
sion sources;” and (4) “one facility will produce an intermediate
product that requires further processing by the other.”84  The func-
tional interrelatedness test does not comport with the more simplis-
tic theory that the proximity of multiple emissions points should
trump as the primary factor in determining whether regulators may
consider the points adjacent.85
The Wehrum Memorandum (Wehrum Memo), issued by the
EPA for the purposes of air aggregation guidance during the
George W. Bush Administration, attempted to bring the issue of
80. See id. (giving hypothetical breakdown of SIC code process); see also Tex.
Health & Safety Code Ann. § 382.051961 (West) (citing relevant Standard Indus-
trial Classification Codes, including; 1311 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas),
1321 (Natural Gas Liquids), 4612 (Crude Petroleum Pipelines), 4613 (Refined Pe-
troleum Pipelines), 4922 (Natural Gas Transmission), and 4923 (Natural Gas
Transmission and Distribution)).
81. See e.g., id. (referring to requirement that plant be under control of same
person).
82. Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Director, Office of Air Quality Plan-
ning and Standards, to Regional Air Division Directors, Regions 1-10, at 1 (Dec. 21,
2012) (showing former practice of using functional interrelatedness test when in-
terpreting adjacent).
83. See id. (describing purpose of interrelatedness test).
84. See Wedeking, supra note 43, at 452 (quoting informal EPA elements of
“functional interrelatedness” test); Memorandum from Douglas E. Hardesty, EPA
Region X, to Robert R. Robichaud, EPA Region X, at 5-6 (Aug. 21, 2001), http://
www.epa.gov/region7/air/nsr/nsrmemos/20010821.pdf (discussing criteria for
adjacent facilities).
85. See generally William L. Wehrum, Memorandum to Regional Administra-
tors I-X (Jan. 12, 2007) (providing guidance for making stationary source
determinations).
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proximity back to the forefront of the adjacency determination.86
Specifically, it encouraged the EPA’s regional offices to understand
the meaning of “adjacent” as expanding upon “contiguous” so as to
aggregate facilities that might skirt the letter of the rule through
separation by a city block or road.87  In other words, “adjacent” al-
lows for aggregation if there is a brief break in surface area owner-
ship, which does nothing to change the common sense notion that
the multiple emissions points operate together as a cohesive indus-
trial unit.88  The memo also underscored the uniqueness of oil and
natural gas production with respect to the industry’s vast network of
pipelines and reasoned that such pipeline connections made the
industry particularly ill-suited for aggregation determinations based
on the functional interrelatedness test.89  Finally, the guidance fore-
saw that an insistence on the functional interrelatedness test would
embroil the EPA in complex, fact-specific inquires when the agency
might better deploy its limited resources elsewhere.90
The Wehrum Memo advocated for an understanding of “adja-
cent” consistent with provisions of the CAA as well as the EPA’s
more specific regulations governing the aggregation of emissions
under the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants (NESHAPs) for oil and natural gas production facilities.91  In
fact, for the purposes of NESHAPs, the EPA’s regulations expressly
provide that emissions from wells located on separate tracts, leases,
and surface sites may not be considered as part of the same facility
86. See id. (discussing importance of physical location for analysis).
87. See id. (seeking to expand definition of adjacent).
88. See id. (arguing for common sense application of emissions aggregation to
industrial plants).
89. Id. (highlighting unique operation of oil and gas industry via pipelines
defeats logical aggregation); see also Wedeking, supra note 43, at 453.
The separation of surface property rights and subsurface mineral rights
also complicates the question of what is “contiguous or adjacent” as oil
and gas companies typically only control the surface area necessary for
well pads and related equipment.  This means that a well field will in-
clude small and scattered islands of land controlled by the company
amidst a sea of property owned and controlled by third parties.
Id.
90. See generally Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85 (discussing EPA admin-
istrative burden).
91. Compare id., with 40 C.F.R. §63.761, and 42 U.S.C. §7412(n)(4).
Emissions from any pipeline compressor or pump station shall not be
aggregated with emissions from other similar units, whether or not such
units are in a contiguous area or under common control, to determine
whether such units or stations are major sources, and in the case of any
oil or gas exploration or production well (with its associated equipment),
such emissions shall not be aggregated for any purpose under this
section.
42 U.S.C. §7412(n)(4).
15
Reer: Bursting the Bubble: Moving Toward "The Common Sense Principle" W
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
76 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI: p. 61
when determining whether the activities constitute a “major
source.”92  With respect to oil and natural gas production, these
regulations even define “facility” as “oil and natural gas production
equipment located within the boundaries of an individual surface
site” and further define “site” as “any combination of one or more
graded pad sites, gravel pad sites, foundations, platforms, or the im-
mediate physical location upon which equipment is physically af-
fixed.”93  While HAP definitions do not affect regulations for
criteria pollutants, they certainly present persuasive authority.94
In 2009, the Obama Administration withdrew the Wehrum
Memo in favor of the McCarthy Memorandum (McCarthy Memo),
which reemphasizes a case-by-case analysis for aggregation determi-
nations.95  Finding the Wehrum Memo’s reliance on proximity too
simplistic, the McCarthy Memo stresses the necessity of adopting a
holistic approach to each determination.96  The McCarthy Memo
does admit, however, that in some circumstances physical proximity
should remain the overwhelming factor in determining whether or
not aggregation should occur.97  Specifically, the McCarthy Memo
has reinstated the use of the functional interrelatedness test as the
initial focus in aggregation determinations.98
The McCarthy Memo seems to react to two regulatory fears
with respect to oil and natural gas development.99  First, regulators
could fear that producers will take advantage of any bright-line geo-
graphic criteria for adjacency, strategically deploying equipment,
assets, and facilities just outside the boundaries of major source
classification, skirting the letter of the regulations.100  Second, regu-
lators could argue that the economic and logistical requirements of
the industry seem especially conducive to aggregation.  For exam-
ple, producers usually must deploy well pads, compressor stations,
and treatment facilities within a certain geographic proximity to
92. 40 C.F.R. § 63.761.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See Gina McCarthy, Memorandum to Regional Administrators Regions I
through X (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/region7/air/nsr/
nsrmemos/oilgaswithdrawal.pdf (emphasizing that “no single determination can
serve as an adequate justification for how to treat any other source determination
for pollutant-emitting activities with different fact-specific circumstances.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See generally id.
100. Compare id., with Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85, at 4-5 (endors-
ing geographic proximity analysis and suggesting that multiple emissions points
should not be aggregated beyond city street or block).
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each other for the entire process to become profitable.101  In this
respect the oil and gas industry differs from other industries, such
as computer manufacturers, where the geographic proximity of the
individual steps of the production process is just one factor in deter-
mining profitability.102
III. THE COMMON SENSE PRINCIPLE
The functional interrelatedness test’s rejection of the proxim-
ity interpretation of “adjacent” was successfully challenged in the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and it seems likely that other natu-
ral gas producers will similarly litigate the legality of the test in
other circuits in the foreseeable future.  This litigation raises the
very real probability of an oncoming split in the circuits and poten-
tially creates an opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to settle
the issue conclusively.  This Part examines the legal and prudential
arguments behind the functional interrelatedness test and then
proceeds to examine the possibility that the EPA will attempt to
checkerboard its policy among the circuits when faced with adverse
decisions.
A. Setbacks to the Functional Interrelatedness Test
Summit Petroleum, a case in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals struck down the functional interrelatedness definition in
favor of proximity, presents a challenge to the EPA’s current aggre-
gation practices.103  Summit Petroleum, a relatively small natural
gas producer, owned a natural gas sweetening plant and sour gas
production wells across forty-three square miles in Rosebush, Michi-
gan.104  Although all the wells fed into the same natural gas sweet-
ening plant, the distances between the wells and the plant varied
from 500 feet to eight miles away.105  Summit Petroleum did not
101. See generally Wedeking, supra note 43, at 6-39.
102. See Alexander Schmitt & Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Proximity Strategies in
Outsourcing Relations, J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/
jibs/journal/v44/n5/full/jibs201310a.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
103. Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2012).  Be-
cause wells and sweetening facility were in Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe’s Isa-
bella Reservation, Michigan’s SIP did not apply to wells or plant. Id.  Instead, the
EPA had direct control of the CAA’s implementation. Id.
104. Id. at 735-36.  Natural gas is considered “sour” when it has too much
hydrogen sulfide for effective use. Id.  Sour gas is sweetened by removing the ex-
cess hydrogen sulfide. Id.
105. Id. at 736 (“None of the well sites share a common boundary with each
other, nor do any of the well sites share a common boundary with Summit’s pro-
duction plant.”).
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own the land between the wells and the sweetening facility.106  After
an extensive, multi-year administrative review, the EPA made a de-
termination to aggregate the wells and sweetening plant as a major
source because they were functionally related.107
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded on the basis that the
functional interrelatedness test did not constitute a permissible in-
terpretation of the word “adjacent,” and it instead found that the
word, as used in the regulation, carries a connotation of proxim-
ity.108  The Court’s holding, which affirms the common sense
meaning of the term “adjacent,” has set off an avalanche of re-
search, scholarship, and blog discussions about replacing the func-
tional interrelatedness test with the common sense interpretation
of the word.109  A move to the proximity definition would bolster
industry’s ability to determine which emissions points to aggregate,
allow the EPA to more efficiently deploy its resources away from
fact-intensive aggregation determinations, and more aptly fulfill the
mandate of Alabama Power.110
The EPA argued in Summit Petroleum that the term “adjacent”
somehow takes on a different, non-proximity meaning in a regula-
tory setting.111  The regulatory context of the word, however, rein-
forces the notion that its drafters intended to connote a sense of
proximity.112  At its most liberal reading, “contiguous or adjacent”
modifies “facility,” and not “building, structure . . . or installa-
tion.”113  Regulators and courts, however, cannot ignore the pres-
ence of these words, which tend to present persuasive reasons for a
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 736.
109. See e.g., Michael Krancer, Litigation “Air War” About DEP’s Air Aggregation
Decision Continues, ENERGY TRENDS WATCH (July 5, 2013), http://energytrends
watch.com/?s=Summit&submit=Search (discussing Summit with respect to its im-
pact on Pennsylvania aggregation determinations and advocating for proximity
reading of adjacent); Kelly Becker, Air Permitting: Sixth Circuit Vacates Single Station-
ary Source Aggregation Determination for E&P Facilities Due to EPA’s Unreasonable Inter-
pretation of Adjacent, ENERGY LAW BLOG (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.theenergylaw
blog.com/2012/08/articles/environmental/air-permitting-sixth-circuit-vacates-sin
gle-stationary-source-aggregation-determination-for-ep-facilities-due-to-epas-unrea
sonable-interpretation-of-adjacent/.
110. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(finding that EPA’s regulations for air aggregation were overly vague and did not
allow private parties to accurately predict whether aggregation should occur;
Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 86, at 3-5 (suggesting that EPA deploy its limited
resources away from long-distance air aggregation determinations).
111. Brief for Respondents at 26-29, Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d 733.
112. See 40 C.F.R. § 71.2.
113. See generally id.
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common sense use of proximity when “facility” is considered within
the larger context of the phrase “building, structure, facility, or in-
stallation.”114  Because the words “building,” “structure,” and “in-
stallation” carry a singular sense, it seems more probable that the
addition of the word “adjacent” intended to encompass the rare
situation in which a public road or other insignificant break in sur-
face area ownership splits a facility than to be so encompassing that
“building,” “structure,” and “installation” either no longer have any
additive meaning to the phrase or are duplicative.115  If “facility”
becomes so broad as to erode “building,” “structure,” and “installa-
tion” it becomes fair to inquire why the drafters chose to include
them at all.116
The functional interrelatedness test, which understands “adja-
cent” as being a matter of degree, not only breaks with the contex-
tual meaning of the word in the regulations, but also clashes with
the notion that the term has any objective sense.117  If regulators
hold that whether two points are adjacent depends on what activi-
ties cause the emissions, they disregard the common sense interpre-
tation which suggests that the industrial actions giving rise to the
emissions have no bearing on their geographical proximity.118  The
agency’s relativist interpretation of the word therefore discards any
objective, logical limitations, causing the Sixth Circuit to remark
114. See generally id.
115. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language [hereinafter Diction-
ary], www.ahdictionary.com (search “building”) (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (build-
ing: something that is built, as for human habitation; a structure); Dictionary, www
.ahdictionary.com (search “structure”) (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (structure: some-
thing made up of a number of parts that are held or put together in a particular
way); Dictionary, www.ahdictionary.com (search “installation”) (last visited Oct. 11,
2012) (installation: a system of machinery or other apparatus set up for use).
116. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 71.2.
117. See e.g., Respondents’ Brief, supra note 111, at 26-29.
[In] Petitioners’ view, the term “adjacent” can only be defined by refer-
ence to concepts of physical distance.  The plain dictionary definition of
adjacent contains no such absolute prohibition.  To the contrary, to have
contextual meaning, adjacency must be evaluated by reference to some
concept in addition to distance. . .Clearly distance alone does not answer
the question of whether two objects are close to one another: are two
properties separated by one mile “close” to one another?  A second ques-
tion must be asked to arrive at a conclusion: for what purpose?”. . .”It is
common sense that the inquiry into “adjacency” cannot stop at exclu-
sively physical distance or geography. . .In certain contexts, the term “ad-
jacent” may contain some absolute distance or geographical limitation
beyond which two objects are no longer considered “adjacent.”  However,
EPA is not interpreting the term “adjacent” here in the narrowly defined
context. . .
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
118. See Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2012).
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that the “EPA makes an impermissible and illogical stretch when it
states that one must ask the purpose for which two activities exist in
order to consider whether they are adjacent to one another.”119
The interpretation of “adjacent” giving rise to the functional inter-
relatedness test, an interpretation which removes the word from the
time-space continuum, seems at odds with a holistic and signifi-
cantly more plausible reading of the phrase “building, structure,
facility, or installation.”120
The common sense interpretation seems not only more intui-
tive with respect to the larger context of the CAA and its interpreta-
tions, but also with respect to the nation’s environmental
protection scheme as a whole.121  Even though different statutes
often give the same word different meanings, the Sixth Circuit
found it significant that Summit Petroleum’s understanding of “ad-
jacent” yielded consistency between the CAA and the Clean Water
Act (CWA).122  At times, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Congressional intent behind the CWA and CAA as preferring con-
sistency in language across the statutes.123  In Rapanos v. United
States, for example, a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that
although there might be some ambiguity in the term “adjacent,”
the Court’s jurisprudence had consistently used “adjacent” and “ad-
joining” interchangeably.124  The Sixth Circuit read this broad lan-
guage to have implications beyond the confines of the CWA in
lending credence to the narrower, more objective, sense of the
word for the purposes of administrative regulation.125
119. Id.
Even the etymology of the term belies the EPA’s position that the term’s
definition is even partially based on the contextual relationship, as op-
posed to the geographic location, of two activities.  Here, our study
reveals that the word “adjacent” originated in the early fifteenth century
from the combination of syllables “ad” and “jet.”  “Ad” is a “prefix expres-
sing direction toward or in addition to, . . . with regard to, [or] in relation
to . . . space or time False”  As incorporated in “adjacent,” the verb “jet”
implies an action resulting in a certain physical resting place for an ob-
ject: “to throw, cast . . . with notion of ‘to cast (oneself) down.’”  Thus,
quite literally, two things are adjacent if they have been “throw [n],
cast . . . down . . . in relation to [one another] .
Id.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 743.
122. Id.; see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (Scalia, J., plu-
rality opinion); United States v. St. Anthony R.R. Co., 192 U.S. 524, 530 (1904).
123. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 748.
124. Id.
125. Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 743.
Together with the ordinary and dictionary definitions of the term ‘adja-
cent,’ the Rapanos decision, and similar case law, points clearly toward the
20
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The use of the functional interrelatedness test also tends to
blur prongs one and three of the EPA’s three-part test originally
issued to guide regulators in determining whether to aggregate a
group of emission points as part of the same facility, building, struc-
ture, or installation.126  If prong two determines whether the activi-
ties are so closely related that one does not generally occur without
the other—or in other words whether they have a functional rela-
tionship—then prong one becomes redundant if it solely deter-
mines whether the sources fall in the same industrial grouping by
comparing their SIC codes.127  It seems unlikely that the EPA could
envision even a theoretical scenario where industrial activities sat-
isfy the functional interrelatedness test and yet do not have the
same SIC codes.128
Furthermore, the EPA does not stand on solid legal ground
when it asserts that a long and well-documented history of consis-
tent interpretation of the word “adjacent” gives it a quasi-protected
status during judicial review.129  First, the Wehrum Memo’s proxim-
ity interpretation makes any such claims of consistency slightly dubi-
conclusion that the regulatory requirement that aggregated activities be
located on contiguous or adjacent properties is unambiguous in the con-
text in which it is here considered.  For the foregoing reasons, we adopt
this position.
Id. (Internal quotations omitted).
126. See generally Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of
Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45
Fed. Reg. 52,695 (1980)(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 124).
127. See generally id.; see also Richard Alonso, supra note 77 (“The 1980 PSD
regulations established the use of two-digit major Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes for analyzing this factor in lieu of analyzing the functional interdepen-
dence of separate units.”).
128. Compare Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 743 (Brief for Petitioner Summit
Petroleum) (questioning whether first and third prongs have analytical difference
under functional interrelatedness test), with Respondents’ Brief, supra note 111
(providing no response to difference between non-responsive on how first and
third prongs are different under functional interrelatedness test).
129. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).
In a curious appeal to entrenched executive error, the dissent contends
that “the appropriateness of the Corps’ 30–year implementation of the
Clean Water Act should be addressed to Congress or the Corps rather
than to the Judiciary.”  Surely this is a novel principle of administrative
law—a sort of 30–year adverse possession that insulates disregard of statu-
tory text from judicial review.  It deservedly has no precedent in our
jurisprudence.
Id.  (Internal citations omitted); see also, Respondents’ Brief, supra note 111, at 31
(“The reasonableness of EPA’s analysis of adjacent in this case, which included
concepts in addition to physical distance, is supported by decades of consistent
interpretation of that term.”).
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ous.130  Second, if the judiciary’s task is to correct error in the three
branches of government it makes no analytical difference whether
the error has stood for minutes or for centuries.131  While a long-
standing interpretation can provide persuasive authority for the
correctness of an interpretation, it by no means stands for the pro-
position that a court should avoid striking down identifiable
error.132
Even if the EPA’s definition of “adjacent” is statutorily permissi-
ble, such a definition appears to place the aggregation regulations
at odds with the Court’s instructions in Alabama Power.133  In Ala-
bama Power, the D.C. Circuit Court considered a host of issues re-
garding the implementation of the CAA, including air
aggregation.134  Finding that Congress clearly intended for aggrega-
tion to occur in some instances because of the law’s definition of
“source” as “any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant,” the D.C. Circuit required the
EPA to develop administrative definitions of the four statutory
terms.135  The Court issued this requirement to aid the EPA in mak-
ing single source air aggregation determinations while giving “ex-
plicit notice” to industries, especially those industries which employ
“pipelines, railroads, and transmission lines,” such that they could
accurately pinpoint when to aggregate multiple emissions points
under the same NSR permit.136
While the D.C. Circuit almost certainly envisioned giving en-
forcement agencies some latitude in making aggregation determi-
nations, it seems unlikely that the Court intended for the EPA to
develop a definition as vague as the functional interrelatedness
test.137  An interpretation that merely states that aggregation is de-
termined on a case-by-case basis in light of a relative definition of
the word “adjacent” does not advance industry’s ability to project
130. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.
131. See id.
132. Compare id., with Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S.
461, 487 (2004) (holding that courts should have greater deference to agency in-
terpretations which have stood for long periods of time); see also Summit Petro-
leum Corp. v. EPA., 690 F.3d 733, 746 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that even if
statutory language was ambiguous no deference was warranted because agency in-
terpretation is contrary to word’s plain meaning).
133. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 398-99.
136. Id. at 397.
137. See generally id. at 397-99.
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol26/iss1/2
2015] BURSTING THE BUBBLE 83
whether an environmental agency will aggregate proposed facilities
and therefore cuts against the articulated logic of the Court.138
Additionally, the functional relatedness test is particularly defi-
cient as applied to the oil and natural gas industry.139  The indus-
try’s dependence on a network of pipelines to move gaseous and
liquid materials from their production point to market poses spe-
cial challenges to the application of the functional interrelatedness
test.140  Simply put, once an environmental agency accepts the pre-
mise that physical connection of one facility to another through a
pipeline establishes functional interrelatedness, no logical limit on
aggregation remains.141  It seems unlikely that Congress intended
for agencies to implement a test which lacks any logical outer geo-
graphical limit when it conceived of the possibility of aggregating
multiple emissions points.142
B. Disproportionate Impact on Vertically Integrated Enterprises
Significant evidence suggests that the EPA’s willingness to ag-
gregate under the functional interrelatedness test disproportion-
ately affects vertically integrated enterprises.143  For example, the
EPA previously determined that aggregation should occur in the
instance of “(1) a soda processing plant and a mine, forty-four miles
distant; (2) a brewery and a farm, six miles apart; (3) a steel mill
and a coke plant, separated by 3.7 miles and Lake Calumet, a land-
fill, and the Little Calumet River; and (4) a wood recycling center
and a combined heat and power boiler three miles away” (Wedek-
ing examples).144  Regulators would have made a determination
that no aggregation could occur in these instances if common own-
ership did not exist.145  Likewise, in the instance of Summit Petro-
leum, it seems indisputable that if the natural gas wells and the sour
gas sweetening facility did not have common ownership, no aggre-
138. See id. at 394, 396-99.
139. See Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85, at 2-3.
140. See id. at 3-4.
141. See generally id.
142. See generally id. at 2-5; see also, Respondents’ Brief, supra note 111, at 24-25
(attempting to delineate aggregation).  “Summit’s sweetening plant, gas wells, and
flares, which work together as a single, physically interconnected system to pro-
duce saleable gas, are exactly the kind of operations that meet a common sense
notion of plant and therefore meet the definition of a single source.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
143. See, e.g., Wedeking, supra note 43, at 451.
144. Id.
145. See 40 C.F.R. § 71.2.
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gation could occur because the two would fail the first prong of the
regulations governing aggregation.146
In fact, when faced with that very same scenario for BP’s Flor-
ida River facility, the EPA chose not to aggregate a compression
facility with nearby gas wellheads in a mixed-ownership field.147  BP,
seeking an NSR permit for a compression facility, owned a fraction
of the natural gas producing wells in a nearby mixed-ownership
field that fed into the field compression facility.148  Because the
compressor station could accept gas from wells not under BP own-
ership and because the BP wells could theoretically supply gas to
other compressor stations, the EPA determined that the emissions
sources were not adjacent and therefore aggregation should not oc-
cur.149  More simply stated, the EPA’s functional interrelatedness
test creates two sets of NSR regulations for an identical activity, one
for vertically integrated enterprises, in which case the EPA will ag-
gregate, and one for non-integrated enterprises, in which case the
EPA will not aggregate.150
The functional interrelatedness test’s use of different technol-
ogy regulations for the same activity under the same SIP, without
regard to geographic proximity, might create arbitrary and capri-
cious distinctions between vertically integrated enterprises and en-
terprises with segmented ownership.151  There does not appear to
be a logical explanation for regulating similar emissions results dif-
ferently solely on the basis of the means by which they arise.152  The
functional interrelatedness test creates this arbitrary and capricious
distinction by minimizing the importance of geographic proximity
146. See generally id. (listing prongs of aggregation regulations as “contiguous
or adjacent” and “under common control”).
147. EPA Region VIII, Response to Comments on the Florida River Compres-
sion Facility’s March 28, 2008 Draft Title V Permit to Operate 4 (Oct. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.epa.gov/region7/air/title5/t5memos/singler8.pdf [here-
inafter RTC Florida River].
148. Id.
149. Id. at 9 (addressing why activities are not contiguous nor adjacent).
As explained below, while gas from Wolf Point and the various wells can
supply gas to Florida River, they can also supply gas to other non-BP facili-
ties in the field and thus do not have the type of dedicated interrelated-
ness that was determinative in other EPA statements on this issue.
Id.  (emphasis in original).
150. Compare Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir.
2012), with RTC Florida River, supra note 147, at 9.
151. See generally 5 U.S.C. (1966) (explaining that reviewing courts may “hold
unlawful and set aside” agency actions “found to be arbitrary and capricious”).
152. See generally id.
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol26/iss1/2
2015] BURSTING THE BUBBLE 85
in aggregation determinations.153  For example, if a wooden furni-
ture company owned its own lumber mill twenty miles from its man-
ufacturing and assembly facility, the emissions of the two could
theoretically be aggregated.154  Yet, if the lumber mill was owned by
a separate party, no aggregation could occur.155  These distances lie
within the range in which the EPA has found aggregation proper in
the past but there is simply no sound environmental policy explain-
ing why the same emissions activity under the same SIP should re-
ceive different aggregation treatment.156
C. Attempted Segmentation of EPA Policy
Not only does the functional interrelatedness test run contrary
to the common sense reading of the word “adjacent,” but it also
cuts against case law and several valid prudential considerations
based on the unique character of the natural gas industry.  Despite
the opportunity after Summit Petroleum to disregard the overly ex-
pansive definition in favor of a reading emphasizing proximity, the
EPA has chosen to continue forward with the functional interrelat-
edness test with an intention to checkerboard among circuits when
faced with adverse decisions.157
In response to Summit Petroleum, the EPA issued a memoran-
dum to its Regional Air Division Directors of Regions 1-10 (Summit
Directive), to advise them that the EPA would respect the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision only within the Court’s jurisdictional limits.158  The
EPA based its decision to limit the scope of the Sixth Circuit’s deci-
sion on the fact that the agency could trace its interpretation of
“adjacent” back more than three decades.159
153. See McCarthy, supra note 95, at 1 (highlighting fact-specific inquiry with
regards to proximity to determine whether adjacency or contiguousness exists).
154. See id.; see also Wedeking, supra note 43, at 451 (citing similar examples of
aggregation to hypothetical posed here).
155. See 45 Fed. Reg. 59,874, 59,878 (Sept. 11, 1980)  (providing general defi-
nition of “control” used by Securities and Exchange Commission); see also EPA
Region 8, Single Source Determination for Coors/TriGen 2 (Nov. 12, 1998), avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/region7/air/title5/t5memos/coorstri.pdf (noting EPA
guidance makes case-by-case determinations of control according to SEC
definition)
156. See Wedeking, supra note 43, at 451 (citing similar examples of aggrega-
tion of sites up to forty-four miles apart).
157. See Page Memorandum, supra note 82, at 1 (applying Summit restriction
on interrelatedness test to Sixth Circuit only).
158. Id.
159. Id.
25
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In 2014, the Clean Air Project  successfully challenged the
EPA’s balkanization of Summit Petroleum in the D.C. Circuit.160  The
Court in NEDACAP found that the Summit Directive impermissibly
contradicted EPA’s “Regional Consistency” regulations, which “as-
sure fair and uniform application by all Regional Offices of the cri-
teria, procedures, and policies employed in implement and
enforcing” the Clean Air Act.161
The Court explicitly reserved the question of whether the Sum-
mit Directive contradicted the language of the CAA, meaning that
the EPA could theoretically remove its regional consistency regula-
tions through a rulemaking and reissue the Summit Directive once
more.162  As of the writing of this article, it appears that the EPA
plans to rewrite its regional consistency regulations to exempt ad-
verse judicial determinations.163
A rewrite of the regional consistency regulations to exempt ad-
verse judicial determinations and a reissuance of the Summit Direc-
tive would likely force a judicial ruling on whether the CAA allows
the checkerboarding of adverse judicial determinations.164  Given
that the issue of whether the Summit Directive violated the CAA
was briefed extensively in NEDACAP, most of the EPA’s legal argu-
ments in favor of its ability to checkerboard adverse judicial deter-
minations appear developed.165
The crux of the EPA’s argument—that the CAA only mandates
procedural uniformity—seems curious.166  First, the CAA seems to
go well beyond procedure in mandating uniformity “in the criteria,
procedures, and policies applied by the various regions.”167  Al-
160. See, e.g., Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’ns Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999,
1011 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding Summit Directive invalid).
161. Id. at 1003.
162. See id. at 1011.
163. Bridget DiCosmo & Lea Radick,Environmentalists Plan Air Permit Lawsuits
Absent EPA ‘Aggregation Rule’, Inside EPA’s Clean Air Report (Feb. 26, 2015), availa-
ble at http://insideepa.com/sites/insideepa.com/files/documents/current_issue/
cleanair_current.pdf, 9 (“In response to the NEDA/ CAP ruling, EPA launched its
rulemaking to better define source definitions, and separately also plans to issue a
notice of proposed rulemaking this year to ‘revise the Regional Consistency regula-
tions to allow an exception for judicial decisions.’”).
164. Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’ns Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999, 1003
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“We need not decide whether the Summit Directive also contra-
venes the requirements of the CAA.”).
165. Brief for Resp’t. EPA, Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’nsRespondent United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. National Environmental Development Association’s
Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999 (2013 WL 3147968 (C.A.D.C. Cir. 2014).
(Appellate Brief).
166. See id.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(2)(A).
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though perhaps not procedural, the functional interrelatedness test
certainly appears to encompass a set of criteria, or even a policy,
regarding aggregation.168  The McCarthy Memo alone mentions
“criteria” seven times and “policy” once.169  The American Heritage
Dictionary defines “criteria” as “a standard, rule, or test on which a
judgment or decision can be based.”170  The definition of “policy,”
meanwhile, is “a course of action, guiding principle, or procedure
considered expedient, prudent, or advantageous.”171
Second, the principle case repeatedly cited by the EPA in sup-
port of its legal authority to checkerboard adverse judicial determi-
nations—Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA—does not seem to
support the proposition that the uniformity requirement goes
solely to procedural processes.172  In Air Pollution Control Dist., the
plaintiffs argued that states violated the CAA’s uniformity require-
ment in promulgating SIPs with differing sulfur oxide emissions
standards for neighboring states.173  The Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that with respect to SIPs, the CAA’s uniformity man-
date applies to only procedural and administrative requirements.174
The Court found that the CAA could not have intended to require
that SIPs have uniform standards because to require each state to
have an identical SIP seems facially contrary to the very notion of
cooperative federalism and delegation of implementation.175  Con-
gress designed the SIP program for the purpose of displacing fed-
eral criteria and policy with respect to implementation, de facto
leaving the procedure of SIP approval, as the only federal interac-
tion to which the uniformity requirement could apply.176  Air Pollu-
tion Control would therefore not seem to apply here, where the
168. See McCarthy, supra note 95, at 1-2.
169. Id.
170. The American Heritage Dictionary, www.ahdictionary.com (search “cri-
teria”) (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (“criteria: a standard, rule, or test on which a
judgment or decision can be based.”).
171. Id. (search “policy”) (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (“policy: a course of ac-
tion, guiding principle, or procedure considered expedient, prudent, or
advantageous.”).
172. See Air Pollution Control Dist. of Jefferson Cnty., Ky. v. EPA, 739 F.2d
1071, 1085 (6th Cir. 1984).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1075, 1085.
176. See id.
27
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policy or criteria being challenged is at the federal, not state,
level.177
The EPA has also raised the issue of the non-acquiescence doc-
trine by arguing that the government generally can re-litigate ad-
verse holdings in multiple circuit courts.178  Defending the Summit
Directive by using the non-acquiescence doctrine presented a risky
proposition, however, as the D.C. Circuit Court determined that
the Directive Summit was invalid.179  CAA’s insistence on uniformity
across air regions preempts the common law doctrine.180
Finally, the Summit Directive also cuts against the Congres-
sional reasoning behind the mandate of regulatory uniformity
across jurisdictions, which was to prevent an administrative
hodgepodge of regulations that could lead to “the inequitable loca-
tion of some industries.”181  Even if it seems questionable that the
Summit Directive would actually influence a natural gas operator to
disproportionately invest in the Sixth Circuit, the Summit Directive
certainly incentivizes such behavior.182
IV. TRENDS IN SIP AGGREGATION POLICIES
This Part examines the efforts energy-producing states have
undertaken to lend clarity and predictability to the functional inter-
relatedness test.  In large part, these efforts have resulted in auto-
matic aggregation for facilities exceptionally close together, but
they have generally failed to lend clarity to multiple emissions
points at greater distances.  Part IV.B examines and advocates for
the Texas model and its use of a strict outer limit beyond which
aggregation may not occur.
177. See Air Pollution Control Dist. of Jefferson Cnty., Ky. v. EPA, 739 F.2d at
1085; see also Appellate Brief, Nat’l Envtl. Dev. Ass’ns Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752
F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
178. See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399,
1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
179. The CAA’s mandate for uniformity in federal criteria and procedures at
least arguably preempted the non-acquiescence doctrine.  The inapplicability of
the EPA test in the Sixth Circuit has created the dueling requirements that Con-
gress sought to avoid through the clear language of the statute.  It seems unlikely
that Congress meant to implement a uniformity standard which could be super-
seded by the checkerboard nature of circuit courts with differing interpretations of
the CAA regulations. See generally Agency Nonacquiescence: Implementation, Justification
and Acceptability, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1233 (1985), available at http://scholar-
lycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol42/iss4/6 (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).
180. Id.
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (1990); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 32,176 (Sep. 9, 1986)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51 and 52).
182. See generally Page Memorandum, supra note 82.
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A. The Quarter Mile Rule Inadvertently Stiffens Regulation
Even though the EPA remains insistent on the functional inter-
relatedness test, some states have seized on the momentum for a
common sense interpretation by adjusting their air aggregation gui-
dance memoranda.183  First, many states with significant unconven-
tional production, including Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, have
implemented a “quarter mile rule” with respect to the functional
interrelatedness test.184  The rule considers multiple emissions
points to be automatically adjacent, and therefore part of the same
facility, if they have common SIC codes, common ownership, and
are located within a quarter mile of each other.185  Beyond a quar-
ter mile, states utilizing the rule make adjacency determinations on
a case-by-case basis.186
Generally speaking, environmental groups seem to disfavor the
perceived rigidity of the quarter mile rule, and at least some nega-
tive judicial treatment of the rule suggests that courts might find
the quarter-mile limitation arbitrary and capricious.187  While in-
183. See David Wagner & Jennifer Smokeline, U.S. Shale Gas in 2012: Top 10
Environmental Legal Issues to Watch, ENERGY &. ENVTL. L. RES. (Feb. 20, 2012), http:/
/www.environmentallawresource.com/2012/02/articles/marcellus-shale-1/us-
shale-gas-in-2012-top-10-environmental-legal-issues-to-watch/; see also TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (West 2011) (enacting legislation in response to
Summit).
184. Guidance for Performing Single Stationary Source Determinations for Oil and
Gas Industries, supra note 19, at 6-7.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 8.
187. See Clean Air Council v. Commonwealth, Before the Envtl. Hearing Bd., 2013
WL 3359657 (June 20, 2013)
There is no explanation for the cut off of [quarter] mile, and even if the
Department had provided an explanation for its chosen cut off distance,
it is clearly a factual issue which may not be decided in the context of a
motion for partial summary judgment.  Why was a distance of [quarter]
mile chosen, as opposed to [a half] mile, one mile, or for that matter,
[one and a half] miles, the distance between the Houston Plant and the
closest compressor station?
Id. See also Major Victory in Shale Air Permitting Case, CLEAN AIR COUNCIL (June 25,
2013), http://www.cleanair.org/program/outdoor_air_pollution/marcellus_
shale/major_victory_shale_air_permitting_case (suggesting that quarter mile rule
is ineffective by limiting inquiry into multiple emissions points separated by more
than quarter mile); Lauren Burge, Pa. DEP Aggregates Natural Gas Compressor Station
with Nearby, GROUP AGAINST SMOG POLLUTION (Aug. 16, 2013), http://gasp-pgh
.org/2013/08/gasps-recent-legal-actions-reduce-compressor-station-emissions.
Last October, DEP issued a guidance document explaining its policy on
how these single source determinations should be made for the oil and
natural gas industries. In practice, DEP has applied this policy in an
overly restrictive manner that is inconsistent with the definition of a
source under the federal Clean Air Act. DEP’s policy states that sources
located within [quarter] mile of each other are presumed to be adjacent
to each other; sources located at a greater distance may be considered
29
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dustrial groups have written in favor of the rule, it remains unclear
how the rule analytically deviates from the functional interrelated-
ness test in any meaningful fashion.188  Thus far, five states have
adopted versions of the quarter mile rule mandating aggregation,
although Texas’s rule differs in significant respects from the rules
adopted in the other four states.189  While variations of the quarter
mile rule exist in a clear minority of jurisdictions, it is significant
that the subscribing states jointly form nearly fifty-seven percent of
the nation’s dry-land natural gas production.190
Theoretically, the traditional quarter mile rule stiffens the reg-
ulations advocated for by the EPA in Summit Petroleum.191  It
adjacent on a case-by-case basis. In practice, however, DEP has tended to
ignore any sources located beyond [quarter] mile, even though U.S. EPA
has clearly stated that there should be no bright-line rule concerning how
far apart sources can be located and still be considered adjacent to each
other.
Id.
188. 188. Luke Liben & Nicolle Bagnell, USEPA Comments on Pennsylvania’s
Draft Aggregation Policy, REED SMITH PUBLICATIONS, http://m.reedsmith.com/usepa-
comments-on-pennsylvanias-draft-aggregation-policy-12-08-2011/ (last visited Oct.
11, 2013), (“[A]s noted by Kathryn Klaber, head of the Marcellus Shale Coalition,
the bright line [quarter] mile test provides an easy to understand, easy to enforce,
and predictable rule.”).
189. See Permitting Collocated Facilities, OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.deq.state.ok.us/aqdnew/resources/fact-
sheets/PermittingCollocatedFacilities.pdf; see also Field Guide to Environmental
Compliance for Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Operations, LA. ENVTL. RESULTS
PROGRAM (Apr. 2012), http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/Portals/0/surveil
lance/Field%20Guide%20to%20Environmental%20Compliance%202012%20FI
NAL_with%20cover.pdf; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (West
Year 2011); Guidance for Performing Single Stationary Source Determinations, supra note
19; see Order Responding to Petitioner’s Request That the Administrator Object to issuance of
a State Operating Permit, Permit Number: 95OPWE035, http://yosemite.epa.gov/
oa/eab_web_docket.nsf/Filings%20By%20Appeal%20Number/89A9C5D4C5C4
C3A18525784200570883/$File/BP’s%20Response%20to%20WildEarth’s%20Peti
tion%20for%20Review%20-%20Exhibits%201%20and%202. . .10.01.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 13, 2013); Engineering Evaluation/Fact Sheet, W. VA. DEP’T. OF EVNTL.
PROT., http://www.dep.wv.gov/daq/Documents/September%202013/Eval%2031
02.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
190. See Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. AD-
MIN. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_EPG0_VGM
_mmcf_a.htm.
191. Some states have used the quarter-mile rule to reaffirm the predomi-
nance of the common sense interpretation of “adjacent.”  For example, in the gui-
dance document instituting the quarter-mile rule in Pennsylvania, the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection stated that “while interde-
pendence may be considered when conducting a single source determination, the
plain meaning of the terms ‘contiguous’ and ‘adjacent’ should be the dispositive
factor when determining whether stationary sources are located on contiguous or
adjacent properties.” Guidance for Performing Single Stationary Source Determinations
for Oil and Gas Industries, supra note 19; but see Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future v.
Ultra Resources, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-1360 (M.D.Pa. Feb. 23, 2015) (affirming that
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removes the discretion of regulators to avoid aggregating sources
within a quarter mile while maintaining the integrity of the func-
tional interrelatedness test beyond that limit.192  Curiously, industry
sources have understood the quarter mile rule to be a de facto limita-
tion on air aggregation beyond the quarter mile limitation.193  One
potential explanation for the deviation between regulatory gui-
dance and industry enthusiasm is that the states are trying to avoid
the EPA’s potential threat to partially disapprove SIPs bold enough
to openly disregard the functional interrelatedness test.194  By leav-
ing the regulatory language for the functional interrelatedness test
intact beyond the quarter mile limit, albeit on a case-by-case basis,
the states can adhere to the letter of the EPA interpretation while
comforting industry sources with the understanding that such case-
by-case determinations will rarely, if ever, occur in actuality.195  This
sleight-of-hand approach would explain the seemingly contradic-
tory guidance some states have issued on air aggregation.196
PADEP should consider functional interrelatedness on case-by-case basis outside
the quarter-mile limit).
192. See id.
193. See e.g., David R. Overstreet & Tad J. Macfarlan, PaDEP Issues Interim Gui-
dance on Air Aggregation, Moves Away from “Functional Interdependence” Test, LEGAL
INSIGHT (Nov. 11, 2013), http://m.klgates.com/files/Publication/0d1bf2b2-89f9-
4364-9a85-eae0306d206b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6d2af6c2-aa67-
4a22-8f78-a4b856efeca8/KLGates_Alert_Air%20Aggregation_Overstreet_Macfar
lan_111011.pdf
[I]n taking this approach, PaDEP has departed from EPA staff guidance
which has taken an expansive view of what is adjacent based on factors
which have little to nothing to do with how close one unit might be to
another . . . Thus, when conducting a contiguous or adjacent analysis,
PaDEP will not consider interrelatedness or interdependence among oil
and gas operation components, such as an extraction well and a compres-
sor station on other property some distance away, in determining adja-
cency (though this may be taken into account in the analysis under the
other prongs). Instead, PaDEP will simply ask whether the extraction,
processing and/or compression facilities are close to one another –
which, in most cases, they are not. This interpretation will result in deter-
minations that approximate with the common sense notion of what con-
stitutes a “plant”; sources many miles apart will not be aggregated.
Id.
194. See Page Memorandum, supra note 82.
195. Pa. DEP Aggregates Natural Gas Compressor Station with Nearby Well Pad,
supra note 187 (“In practice, DEP has applied this policy in an overly restrictive
manner that is inconsistent with the definition of a ‘source’ under the federal
Clean Air Act.”).  Another explanation could be that regulators wish to retain the
discretion to aggregate two major sources that appear related under a single per-
mit.  Allowing two closely connected major sources to fall under the umbrella of a
single Title V permit could ease compliance and enforcement efforts for both the
permit holder and implementing agency.
196. See e.g., Field Guide to Environmental Compliance for Oil and Gas Exploration
and Production Operations, supra note 189.
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B. The Texas Model: The Best Alternative
The Texas model for aggregation flips the traditional quarter
mile rule by embracing a proximity analysis for emissions points
closer than a quarter mile together and altogether banning aggre-
gation of emissions points separated by distances greater than the
quarter mile limit.197  The Texas model enacts the proximity analy-
sis advocated by the Wehrum Memo. This enables most permit ap-
plicants to accurately project whether they will be aggregated, and
may prove to be far more favorable to the oil and natural gas indus-
try in the long-run.198  The Texas model was legislatively enacted in
2011, but only applies to natural gas and oil production facilities.199
Texas’s quarter mile limit has not yet received either a court chal-
lenge or an official determination, but given the state’s historically
antagonistic relationship with the EPA, a court challenge might
come soon.200
Oil and gas production facilities that are contiguous or adjacent and
under common control and separated by a distance less than or equal to
0.25 mile must be aggregated to determine if the group of facilities are a
major source for permitting. Facilities separated by a distance of greater
than 0.25 mile are considered separate facilities for permitting purposes.
Facilities greater than 0.25 miles apart are issued separate air permits.
Facilities may be aggregated and can then be issued one permit or a sepa-
rate permit can be issued for each facility. However, given the particular
circumstances for a given case (e.g., interdependency), the DEQ may
consider sites separated by a distance greater than 0.25 mile to be
contiguous.
Id.
197. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (West 2011).
198. See id.
199. See id. (“This section applies only to new facilities or modifications of
existing facilities that belong to Standard Industrial Classification Codes 1311
(Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas), 1321 (Natural Gas Liquids), 4612 (Crude
Petroleum Pipelines), 4613 (Refined Petroleum Pipelines), 4922 (Natural Gas
Transmission), and 4923 (Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution).”).
200. See generally Jake Tapper, EPA Regional Administrator Resigns After Outcry
Over “Crucify” Comments, ABC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/politics/2012/04/epa-regional-administrator-resigns-after-outcry-over-cruci
fy-comments/
The 2010 video, publicized by frequent EPA foe Senator James Inhofe, R-
Okla., showed Armendariz saying that he gave the following analogy to
his staff about his ‘“philosophy of enforcement,” which he acknowledged
being crude and perhaps inappropriate, but shared anyway: “It is kind of
like how the Romans used to conquer villages in the Mediterranean –
they’d go into a little Turkish town somewhere and they’d find the first
five guys they saw, they’d crucify ‘em, and that little town was really easy to
manage for the next few years.
Id.
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Oklahoma has informally experimented with a hybrid model
that contains both inner and outer limits.201  The Oklahoma De-
partment of Environmental Quality has published informal gui-
dance which suggests that emissions points less than a quarter mile
apart must always aggregate while those greater than five miles
apart may never aggregate.202  Oklahoma’s informal guidance ben-
efits environmental agencies through its universal applicability,
whereas alternatively, the Texas statute remains limited to enumer-
ated SIC codes related to the oil and natural gas industry.203
A hard outer limit directly advances the common sense inter-
pretation of “adjacent” by removing the latitude previously given to
regulators under the functional interrelatedness test.204 The hard
outer limit disables regulators from considering emissions points
several miles apart as somehow part of the same facility.205  The
Texas statute instead advances the common sense idea that agen-
cies should never aggregate emissions points greater than quarter
mile apart under any interpretation of “adjacent.”206  The statute
enacts a natural evolution of the definition of “adjacent,” adhering
to the common sense, proximity-driven interpretation of the word,
while maintaining the overall case-by-case flexibility Congress must
have intended in issuing a set of criteria for determining aggrega-
tion rather than a numerical radial limit.207
The EPA correctly argues that Congress intended to give envi-
ronmental agencies case-by-case discretion in at least some air ag-
gregation determinations.208  The nature of the guiding phrase
201. Permitting Collocated Facilities, supra note 189; see also Application for Authori-
zation to Use General Plan Approval and/or General Operating Permit General Permit or
BAQ-GPA/GP-5 Natural Gas Compression and/or Processing Facilities, PADEP Doc No:
2700-PM-BAQ0205, http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-
106065/2700-PM-BAQ0205%20GP-5%20Application%20Form.pdf (requesting
map of facilities within five miles, suggesting that outer limit of aggregation deter-
mination is five miles).
202. See Permitting Collocated Facilities, supra note 189 (“Are the entities located
in different counties and are the property boundaries located more than five miles
apart? . . . If the answer to this question is yes, then based on geographic distance
and logistics these air-emitting entities are not considered adjacent.”).
203. Compare id., with TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (West
2011).
204. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (West 2011).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Compare TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (West 2011)
(allowing for case-by-case determinations at distances less than quarter mile while
banning aggregation at distances greater than quarter mile), with Alabama Power
Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (requiring EPA to issue set of adminis-
trative criteria to determine whether multiple emissions points were adjacent).
208. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(5)
33
Reer: Bursting the Bubble: Moving Toward "The Common Sense Principle" W
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
94 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI: p. 61
“building, structure, facility, or installation” invites a limited subjec-
tive analysis and certainly does not comport with a bright line test,
which holds that sources must automatically aggregate before a cer-
tain point and may never be aggregated beyond a certain point.209
None of the models suggested thus far challenge this presump-
tion.210  The EPA model completely embraces a case-by-case analy-
sis, the traditional quarter mile model utilizes a case-by-case analysis
at distances greater than quarter mile, and the Texas model uses a
case-by-case analysis at distances less than quarter mile.211  Even the
Oklahoma model uses case-by-case analysis at distances between
quarter mile and five miles.212  The most natural use of a proximity-
driven case-by-case analysis, however, would be prior to a limitation
on aggregation rather than after a mandatory aggregation line.213
The proximity-driven reading of adjacent, advocated by the
Wehrum Memo, characterizes the regulatory use of “adjacent” as
giving administrative officials the flexibility to aggregate where a
road or city block separates multiple emissions points.214  This anal-
ysis implies a case-by-case examination concerning facilities that
stand close together in distance.215  The traditional quarter mile
rule, however, tends to reject case-by-case analysis of closely related
emissions points in favor of individual determinations at greater dis-
tances.216  If case-by-case determinations are proper at close dis-
tances, such as in the instance of a facility separated by a city block
or road, then the Texas model is the only one which truly embraces
209. Clean Air Council v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra note 187.
The Department’s Guidance suggests that properties separated by a dis-
tance of [quarter] mile or less are unequivocally ‘proximate,’ ‘nearby’ or
‘close enough’ to be adjacent, whereas properties separated by more than
[quarter] mile must be examined on a case-by-case basis.  There is no
explanation for the cut off of [quarter] mile, and even if the Department
had provided an explanation for its chosen cut off distance, it is clearly a
factual issue which may not be decided in the context of a motion for
partial summary judgment.  Why was a distance of [quarter] mile chosen,
as opposed to [quarter] mile, one mile, or for that matter, [one and a
half] miles, the distance between the Houston Plant and the closest com-
pressor station?
Id.
210. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (2011); see also Mc-
Carthy, supra note 95; Permitting Collocated Facilities, supra note 189.
211. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (2011); McCarthy,
supra note 95.
212. Permitting Collocated Facilities, supra note 189.
213. See generally Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Compare id., with Guidance for Performing Single Stationary Source Determina-
tions for Oil and Gas Industries, supra note 19.
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case-by-case determinations in their proper role.217  It would seem
highly unusual, for example, for a road to have a width stretching a
distance greater than a quarter mile.218  The traditional quarter
mile rule’s stiffness at the very distances at which the Wehrum
Memo seems to specifically endorse proximity-driven, case-by-case
analysis seems to place the two in tension.219
The quarter mile rule’s deficiencies become more apparent
when considered against the very types of situations that a proxim-
ity-driven analysis is designed to avoid.220  The traditional quarter
mile rule which defaults to the functional interrelatedness test after
the quarter mile limit would simply not have affected the final de-
termination in the situation of the Wedeking Examples;
(1) a soda processing plant and a mine, forty-four miles
distant; (2) a brewery and a farm, six miles apart; (3) a
steel mill and a coke plant, separated by 3.7 miles and
Lake Calumet, a landfill, and the Little Calumet River; and
(4) a wood recycling center and a combined heat and
power boiler three miles away.221
The rule fails to unilaterally enforce a proximity-driven analysis
where it is needed most: when common sense dictates that two
emissions points separated by several miles are not adjacent.222
A true, universal outer limit on aggregation poses no such
problems.223  Texas’s statutorily-enacted quarter mile limit, if uni-
versally applicable, would allow case-by-case analysis in determina-
tions involving multiple emissions points at close distances, such as
those separated by a city block or public road.224  For example,
under a universally applicable Texas model, if a commonly-owned
217. Compare Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85, with Guidance for Perform-
ing Single Stationary Source Determinations for Oil and Gas Industries, supra note 19.
218. See generally Lane Width, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/geometric/pubs/mitigationstrategies/chapter3/
3_lanewidth.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
219. Compare Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85, with Guidance for Perform-
ing Single Stationary Source Determinations for Oil and Gas Industries, supra note 19.
220. See generally Wedeking, supra note 43, at 451 (supplying examples).
221. Id.
222. Compare Guidance for Performing Single Stationary Source Determinations for
Oil and Gas Industries, supra note 19, with Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d
733, 736 (6th Cir. 2012) (advocating for proximity-driven interpretation of adja-
cent where multiple emissions points are spread over forty-three acres as opposed
to functional interrelatedness test’s long-distance aggregation determination).
223. Compare TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (2011), with
Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85.
224. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (West 2011)
(applying case-by-case determinations at distances less than quarter mile).
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soda processing plant and a mine are separated by a short city
block, a case-by-case analysis gives environmental agencies the flexi-
bility to decide whether to aggregate the two emissions points based
on whether they constitute a single facility.225
Unlike the traditional quarter mile rule, the Texas model
would address the very types of agency decisions a proximity-driven
interpretation of adjacent should avoid.226  In the Wedeking Exam-
ples, even a more generous three mile outer limit would certainly
have removed the discretion of regulators to aggregate the multiple
emissions points in each instance, such as in the example of a soda
processing plant and mine separated by forty-four miles.227
Mandating that multiple emissions points stand at most a cer-
tain geographic distance in relation to each other reinforces the
objective sense of “adjacent” so strongly endorsed by the Summit
court.228  Outer limits emphasize the importance of proximity, and
they naturally raise analytical questions with respect to the geo-
graphic relationship between points.229  It would seem difficult to
conceive of a place for the functional interrelatedness test in a state
that embraces strict outer limits because the functional analysis
stands in such contrast to geographic determinations.230  Instead,
geographic limits would tend to promote questions of whether mul-
tiple emissions points are truly adjoining.231
Universally applicable strict outer limits would also significantly
advance the goals of Alabama Power by aiding industry’s ability to
project whether or not to aggregate emissions points.232  Exclusive
use of the functional interrelatedness test lends very little predict-
225. Compare Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85, with Guidance for Perform-
ing Single Stationary Source Determinations for Oil and Gas Industries, supra note 19.
226. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (2011).
227. See generally id.; Wedeking, supra note 43, at 451 (supplying examples);
see infra notes 244-245 and accompanying text for analysis as to whether wide-
spread use of the Texas model will incentivize producers to strategically deploy
equipment and facilities to avoid major source classification.
228. See Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2012)
(reemphasizing objective definition of “adjacent”).
229. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (2011) (en-
acting quarter mile limit and factual analysis with respect to proximity between two
emissions points).
230. Compare id. (limiting geographic distance between two aggregated
points), with McCarthy, supra note 95 (contemplating whether two points practi-
cally act as one industrial unit while acknowledging that proximity might be over-
riding factor).
231. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (finding that
federal interpretations of regulations tend to use “adjacent” and “adjoining”
interchangeably).
232. See id. See generally Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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ability to NSR air aggregation determinations and the quarter-mile
rule only lends predictability to multiple emissions points within
quarter mile of each other.233  Both of these models contain flaws
because the resulting analysis does not contain a logical stop-point
beyond which agencies may no longer aggregate facilities.234  A
strict outer limit has the immediate effect of making significantly
more finite the number of multiple emissions points eligible for
aggregation.235  In the instance of a universally applicable Texas
model, the statutory language would allow for a mere quarter-mile
zone in which regulators have discretion to aggregate, meaning
that a vast majority of industrial sources could predict early in the
project development stages whether aggregation could occur.236
With respect to the unique nature of the oil and natural gas
industry, strict outer limits on aggregation seem particularly use-
ful.237  First, any reasonable outer limit virtually guarantees that a
plethora of well pads could not aggregate with a treatment plant.238
Second, an outer limit that remains unpaired with a mandatory ag-
gregation radius allows for common sense case-by-case determina-
tions when one or two well pads occur in close proximity to
treatment plants, such as in the instance of Summit Petroleum.239
A regulator viewing the Summit Petroleum treatment plant and
the closest well pad, a mere five hundred feet away, might deter-
mine under the Texas model that the checkerboard nature of natu-
ral gas leasing does not satisfy the type of incidental break in
ownership envisioned by the Wehrum Memo.240  Breaks in owner-
ship which are common, and even purposeful, because of the na-
233. See Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 736; see also McCarthy, supra note 96;
Guidance for Performing Single Stationary Source Determinations for Oil and Gas Indus-
tries, supra note 19.
234. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.051961 (West 2014); see also
McCarthy, supra note 95 (refusing to set limit beyond which two sources may no
longer be aggregated).
235. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 382.051961 (enacting five mile limit).
236. See id.
237. See generally Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85 (acknowledging
unique nature of oil and gas production industry).
238. Processing Natural Gas, supra note 47 (“A complex gathering system can
consist of thousands of miles of pipes, interconnecting the processing plant to
upwards of 100 wells in the area. According to the American Gas Association’s Gas
Facts 2000, there was an estimated 36,100 miles of gathering system pipelines in
the U.S. in 1999.”).
239. Compare Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 736 (stating facts of case), with
Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85 (emphasizing case-by-case analysis where
emissions sources are separated by a short distance).
240. Compare Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 736, with Wehrum Memorandum,
supra note 85.
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ture of the industry, such as checkerboard ownership between
natural gas leases, might be treated differently than breaks in own-
ership which are merely incidental due to the existence of a public
road, a wetland preventing development, or a utility easement.241
Agencies should examine the nature of the break in ownership,
and determine whether it is an industry pattern or an anomaly, dur-
ing case-by-case review.  Again, this secondary test seems distinct
from the functional interrelatedness determination, which merely
encompasses the utilitarian relationship between the two points.
Vertically integrated enterprises would also benefit from the
promulgation of outer limits, which would practically end long-dis-
tance aggregation determinations where companies own multiple
emissions points within the same industrial grouping.242  Agencies
might ask reasonable questions about whether permits should con-
sider multiple emissions points part of the same facility if the steps
of the industrial process occur within a quarter mile of each other
but certainly not at distances of forty or more miles.243  While
agency determinations in the Texas model might result in some dis-
proportionate aggregation of vertically integrated enterprises if de-
terminations were made on a case-by-case basis at close distances,
such determinations would seem more consistent with the overall
notion of “facility.”244  Disproportionate aggregation might result
from the structure of NSR determinations no matter what the ag-
gregation scheme given the overall goals and purposes of the
CAA.245  It also seems consistent with the plain language of the stat-
ute to apply major source classification when industry co-locates sev-
eral steps of the production process in the same facility or
installation.246  In any event, the increased efficiency gained by lo-
cating several steps of the industrial process in the same location
would at least superficially seem to far outweigh any benefits of seg-
menting stages of production at great distances to avoid major
source classification.247
241. See generally Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85 (arguing some indus-
tries are more conducive to case-by-case analysis than others).
242. HEALTH & SAFETY § 382.051961 (limiting adjacency to quarter mile).
243. See generally Wehrum Memorandum, supra note 85.
244. Compare Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 736, with id.
245. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (2014).
246. See id.
247. Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 736.  The Sixth Circuit leaves open the
question of whether the EPA would have actually fared better under the quarter
mile rule.  The Respondents’ Brief argues that “[e]ven if emissions from only one
sour gas production well is [sic] taken into account, the emissions from that well in
conjunction with the emissions from the sweetening plant exceeds one hundred
38
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It appears highly unlikely that the EPA will embrace the Texas
model, mostly because outer limits claw back the regulatory discre-
tion that the functional interrelatedness test creates through case-
by-case aggregation determinations.248  Part of the EPA’s apprehen-
sion to embrace the Texas model might stem from the regulatory
fear that setting any strict geographic limit will incentivize industry
to strategically plan facilities which fall just outside the outer
boundary.249  The economic principles behind this suggestion, at
least for oil and natural gas production, remain far from fully devel-
oped.250  Oil and natural gas producers have less leeway in infra-
structure siting and development, particularly with respect to
treatment plants, than agencies might imagine.251  For example,
not only is it extremely expensive to lay pipeline from well pads to
treatment facilities, but producers must separate these pipelines
from the interstate pipeline network until the natural gas meets cer-
tain quality standards.252  Even in the highly unlikely event that
tons per year of sulfur dioxide.”  Brief for Respondents, supra note 111, at 15.  Per-
haps the result of Summit Petroleum would have been different had the EPA aggre-
gated the nearest producing well, which was within a quarter mile, to achieve the
desired end of classifying the sweetening plant as a major source. Compare Lumi-
nant Generation Co., L.L.C. v. Envt’l. Prot. Agency, 675 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir.
2012) (outlining requirements of Clean Air Act on major sources), with Processing
Natural Gas, supra note 47 (finding that constructing one mile of pipeline costs an
average of one million dollars). See generally Jacus, supra note 51.
248. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementa-
tion Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg.
52,676, 52,695 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 124).
“EPA is unable to say precisely at this point how far apart activities must be in order
to be treated separately.  The Agency can answer that question only through case-
by-case determinations.” Id. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 111, at 7-8, 15.
“EPA recognized that case-specific analysis would be necessary to determine
whether certain pollutant emitting activities met the common sense notion of a
plant.” Id.
249. Wedeking, supra note 43, 6-39.
250. Id.
251. EIA - Natural Gas Pipelines Network - Transportation Process & Flow, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_pub
lications/ngpipeline/process.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
252. Id.
The principal service provided by a natural gas processing plant to the
natural gas mainline transmission network is that it produces pipeline
quality natural gas. Natural gas mainline transmission systems are de-
signed to operate within certain tolerances. Natural gas entering the sys-
tem that is not within certain specific gravities, pressures, Btu content
range, or water content level will cause operational problems, pipeline
deterioration, or even cause pipeline rupture.
Id.  See also Unconventional Natural Gas Infrastructure Development in Pennsylvania, KEY-
STONE ENERGY FORUM, at 1, available at http://www.keystoneenergyforum.com/
uploads/files/28/KEF%20Infrastructure.pdf (finding that, on average, it costs one
million dollars to lay one mile of pipeline).
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hard outer limits do in fact incentivize operators to strategically
place their emissions activities just beyond the agency’s aggregation
reach, Congress or the EPA should address such a problem through
either an amendment to the regulations or the CAA, not by redefin-
ing the word “adjacent.”253
V. CONCLUSION
The dramatic increase of domestic natural gas production has
brought air aggregation to the forefront of the industry’s focus.254
While there are certainly instances in which air aggregation can
and should be used as an effective tool of administrative enforce-
ment, the functional interrelatedness test not only seems contrary
to the plain meaning of both the CAA and case law directives, but
also unduly burdensome to vertically integrated enterprises.255
Given the tenuous legal groundwork behind the test and the vast
amount of administrative resources currently engaged in the heav-
ily fact-intensive determinations that the functional interrelatedness
test requires, the EPA and state agencies should consider adopting
more objective aggregation criteria so that they might deploy their
limited resources elsewhere.256
The Texas model, which could be improved by making it appli-
cable to all aggregation determinations in the state, is just one sug-
gestion for a statutory scheme that favors reasonable, objective
limits on aggregation without sacrificing the flexibility necessary to
make case-by-case determinations when needed.  Outer limits on
aggregation would objectively limit the discretion of regulators to
aggregate facilities which, under any sense of the word, simply
should not be considered adjacent.  Outer limits promulgate the
common sense interpretation of “adjacent,” and have the added bo-
nus of advancing the directives of Alabama Power, which advocate
for greater predictability in aggregation determinations.257  In addi-
tion, the concept of outer limits is supported by many of the com-
253. See generally Rhinelander, supra note 67 at 10416.
Congress, as the ultimate authority over cleaning up the air, has the pri-
mary duty to make its policy clear on the use of the bubble concept.  EPA
and the courts have invested heavily in resolving the uncertainty in the
Clean Air Act over the propriety of various sorts of bubbles. While the
Supreme Court might clarify the matter, Congress is the proper forum in
which to find comprehensive answers.
Id.
254. See generally Wedeking, supra note 43.
255. See Summit Petroleum, 690 F.3d at 746; see also Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 397.
256. See generally Jacus, supra note 51.
257. Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 397.
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mon sense public policy principles undercut by the functional
interrelatedness test, such as the recognition of the unique nature
of the natural gas production industry.  At this critical moment in
the nation’s natural gas development, it is more important than
ever that the regulations make intuitive sense vis-a`-vis the statutory
scheme and allow producers to accurately project their aggregation
determinations when deciding where to invest critical resources.
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